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NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT:
AN AMBITIOUS PURPOSE; A PARTIAL
DEMISE
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974 the Sierra Club and two other groups concerned with pres-
ervation of the environment,' brought an action in the Federal District
Court for the District of Columbia alleging that the Department of the
Interior and the Office of Management and Budget had violated the
provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).2 The
plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that these agencies and the
National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS)3 had failed to consider
properly the environmental consequences of the annual budget request
of the NWRS. The plaintiffs alleged that the "proposed curtailments in
the budget of the National Wildlife Refuge Systems ...would 'cut
back significantly the operations, maintenance, and staffing of units
within the System.' "" The plaintiffs contended, therefore, that NEPA
required the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
to consider the environmental consequences of the System's appropria-
tions request.5
Relying heavily upon the Council on Environmental Quality's
(CEQ) interpretations of NEPA, the United States Supreme Court, in
Andrus v. Sierra Club,6 decided that an agency is not required to pre-
pare an EIS with respect to its annual budget request.
This note will first examine the Andrus decision and its underlying
rationale. Thereafter, analysis will be directed toward NEPA and its
1. The two other groups were the National Parks and Conservation Association and the
Natural Resources Defense Council. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 99 S. Ct. 2335, 2338 n.4 (1979).
2. The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976), will be referred to
throughout this note as either NEPA or the Act.
3. The National Wildlife Refuge System will be referred to throughout this note as either
the NWRS or the System.
4. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 99 S. Ct. 2335, 2338 (1979). The primary purpose of the NWRS is
environmental in nature. The System was established "to preserve endangered species and to
sustain populations of migratory birds, particularly waterfowl, by maintaining intact a diverse
network of their natural habitats." Sierra Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 895, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
The System's secondary purpose is educational and recreational. Id.
5. Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187, (D.D.C. 1975), afd sub nom. Sierra Club v.
Andrus, 581 F.2d 895 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd, Andrus v. Sierra Club, 99 S. Ct. 2335 (1979).
6. 99 S. Ct. 2335 (1979).
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legislative history, the authority of the CEQ, and the cases that have
dealt with the dilemma of whether appropriations requests are propos-
als for legislation. The Andrus decision will be examined in the light of
these authorities. It is the thesis of this note that the Andrus case was
erroneously decided because its holding is in conflict with NEPA's leg-
islative history, its purpose, and its directive which calls for preparation
of an EIS at the appropriation stage of federal action. Furthermore,
the Court should not have placed such weight upon the CEQ interpre-
tation of NEPA since that interpretation clashes with the purposes of
the Act as evidenced by both its language and its legislative history. It
is proposed that the Court missed its opportunity to require an EIS in
the early stages of the decision making process when the influence of an
EIS is the greatest.
II. THE FACTUAL AND DECISIONAL BACKGROUND TO THE
SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
The National Wildlife Refuge System consists of more than 350
refuges containing more than thirty million acres in forty-nine states.7
During the 1960's, the System experienced territorial growth and in-
creased public use of its land.8 A policy decision was made, however,
to plan for "roughly constant total expenditure."9 "[R]esources de-
voted to staff and maintain the. . .System have not kept up with the
rate of territorial growth."' 0 This unchanging expenditure has resulted
in "a 7% decrease in staffing, while the number of field stations in-
creased by 10 percent. This has led to a substantial ($83 million) back-
log of rehabilitation work, as well as unfulfilled construction work, new
and replacement.""
The Sierra Club claimed that this unchanging nature of the
NWRS budget and the corresponding reduction in the System's ability
to maintain the refuges would significantly affect the environment. The
Club argued that the NWRS was "required to issue a detailed state-
ment on the environmental impact of such annual budget proposals."' 2
The Sierra Club advanced two arguments in support of its conten-
7. The System is organized under the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act
of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd-668ee (1976). The System is administered by the Fish and Wildlife
Service of the Department of the Interior. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 99 S. Ct. at 2338.
8. Sierra Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 895, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
9. Id. at 898.
10. Id. at 897.
11. Id. at 897-98 (footnotes omitted).
12. Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187, 1188 (D.D.C. 1975).
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tion that an EIS must be prepared to evaluate the environmental conse-
quences of the System's unchanging budget. The Club argued:
(a) that past and present proposals to cut down on NWRS
operations are "proposals for legislation. . . significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment . . ." or
(b) that the NWRS is so vital to protection of the environ-
ment that the annual proposal on the scope and nature of its
operation per se "significantly affect[s] the quality of the
human environment."' 3
The thrust of the Club's action, therefore, was that the annual budget
request came within the mandates of NEPA which require that such an
EIS accompany "every recommendation or report on proposals for leg-
islation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment . ... 14
The district court15 agreed with the Sierra Club and held that
NEPA applied to appropriations requests because such requests are
13. Sierra Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 897, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Embodied in the Club's sec-
ond argument is the requirement that the proposed action must be major federal action. The Club
advanced an additional argument that NEPA required the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) "to develop procedures to assure consideration of environmental factors in the budget
process, including identification of which budget requests have significant environmental conse-
quences and what is required of the agencies of the executive branch in submitting these requests
to OMB." Id.
14. Section 102 of NEPA states:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the poli-
cies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and adminis-
tered in accordance with the policies set forth in this Chapter, and (2) all agencies of the
Federal Government shall-
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the inte-
grated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in plan-
ning and in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality established by subchapter II of this chapter, which will
insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given
appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical consid-
erations;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,
a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the propo-
sal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
15. Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187 (D.D.C. 1975).
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both proposals for legislation 6 and "major Federal actions which
clearly have a significant effect on the environment." 7 The district
court agreed with the Club's per se argument that budget proposals
relating to a major federal operation such as the NWRS have a signifi-
cant effect upon the environment. 8 The court stated, simply, that
"when the important interrelationship between the Refuge System and
the budget process is considered, the unmistakable conclusion is that
both the environmental impact of budget decisions is significant and
that the federal action involved is major."' 9 The court supported its
conclusion by taking note of the congressional objective of ensuring
executive consideration of environmental values during the "constant
revision and reevaluation of ongoing projects."20 In addition, the court
found that guidelines issued by the CEQ,2 ' which explicitly defined
federal actions to include requests for appropriations,22 were "a persua-
sive interpretation of NEPA"23 and, therefore, entitled to considerable
weight. The Department of the Interior and the Office of Management
and Budget, therefore, were ordered to consider, prepare, and dissemi-
nate an EIS 4 on every annual request or recommendation they make
for funding the System.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
agreed with the district court that Congress intended the EIS require-
ment of NEPA to apply to the budget preparation process .2  The court
disagreed, however, with the district court's application of the EIS re-
quirement to every budget request. The court felt that such an applica-
tion to the annual operation of an agency whose activities may have a
16. Id. at 1189.
17. Id.
18. Sierra Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 897, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
19. Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187, 1189 (D.D.C. 1975).
20. Id. at 1188.
21. 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (1979).
22. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.5 (1979).
Types of Actions covered by this Act.
(a) "Actions" include but are not limited to:
(1) Recommendations or favorable reports relating to legislation including requests
for appropriations. The requirement for following the section 102(2)(C) procedure as
elaborated in these guidelines applies to both (i) agency recommendations on their own
proposals for legislation . . . and (ii) agency reports on legislation initiated elsewhere.
40 C.F.R. § 1500.5 (1979) (emphasis added).
23. Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187, 1188 (D.D.C. 1975).
24. "'Environmental Impact Statement' means a detailed written statement as required by
Sec. 102(2)(C) of the Act." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11 (1979).
25. Sierra Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 895 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
[Vol. 15:553
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significant environmental impact "would trivialize NEPA."2 6 In order
to limit the broad scope of the district court's holding, the court of ap-
peals concluded that NEPA's reference to proposals for legislation
should be understood to encompass only those proposals "for taking
new action which significantly [change] the status quo, not for a routine
request for budget approval and appropriations for continuance and
management of an ongoing program."27 Thus, the court of appeals
held that unless the appropriations request would change existing con-
ditions, there is no need to require the preparation of an EIS. z8 In ad-
dition to its concern with reducing the effect of NEPA, the court
indicated that the mandates of the Act could be overburdened by ap-
plying its requirements to every appropriations request2 9 The court of
appeals noted that NEPA's rule of reason3° "does not require an an-
nual EIS on routine operation and maintenance of every program with
significant environmental ramifications. [The Act] ...does not de-
mand rethinking of everything all the time."'"
The Supreme Court granted certiorari32 and reversed.33 The
Court held that an EIS was not required to accompany an appropria-
tions request because such a request is neither a proposal for legislation
nor a proposal for major federal action. 34 Federal agencies are not,
therefore, required to attach an EIS to a budget request because the
requirements of NEPA are aimed at the processes of "planning and
decisionmaking"35 and do not apply to requests which merely "fund
actions already proposed. 36
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Andrus v. Sierra
Club 37 provided a final answer to the longstanding question of whether
NEPA's EIS requirement should apply to the federal appropriations
process. The Court's reasoning provides a solid base from which to
26. Id. at 903.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 902.
29. Id. at 903.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 906.
32. 439 U.S. 1065 (1978).
33. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 99 S. Ct. 2335 (1979).
34. Id. at 2343.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (1976).
36. 99 S. Ct. at 2343.
37. 99 S. Ct. 2335 (1979).
1980]
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analyze the decision. The Sierra Club argued that the NWRS, by its
very nature, size, and scope, is a vital part of the environment and that
proposals for reducing its budget necessarily have significant effects
upon the environment and'require an EIS.38
The Court ignored the Club's environmental contentions39 and fo-
cused on the narrower question of whether an appropriations request is
a "recommendation or report on proposals for legislation ... [or]
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment . "..."40 An affirmative answer would demand
that an EIS be prepared as required by NEPA.4' The Court held that
appropriations requests are neither proposals for legislation nor pro-
posals for major federal actions. 42 The Court disregarded the Act's leg-
islative history because no direct evidence could be found expressly
specifying that appropriations were to be considered as proposals for
legislation.43 The Court was remiss in not acknowledging the essence
of the legislative history which repeatedly advocated preparation of an
EIS early in the decision making process.44 At the appropriations
stage, a knowledge of environmental consequences might be a deciding
factor in a decision to allocate funds.45
The Court reached its holding by finding that appropriations
"have the limited and specific purpose of providing funds for author-
ized programs"46 and are not, therefore, proposals for legislation.47
Building upon that premise, the Court found that appropriations did
not constitute proposals for major federal actions "since appropriation
requests do not 'propose' federal actions at all; they instead fund ac-
tions already proposed. 48
The Court's conclusion is weakened because it does not admit that
legislation can be changed in the appropriations process, through fund-
ing increases and decreases, and the attachment of riders, without any
38. Id. at 2338-39.
39. The Court reasoned that the significant effects upon the quality of the environment could
not be predicted because of the variety of respones to a budget reduction. 99 S. Ct. at 2344.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
41. Id.
42. 99 S. Ct. at 2343.
43. Id. at 2340.
44. See notes 71-94 infra and accompanying text.
45. See notes 4-5 supra and accompanying text.
46. 99 S. Ct. at 2343 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978)).
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apparent change in the existing statutes.49
The Court relied upon TV4 v. Hill5 ° for its definition that appro-
priations "have the limited and specific purpose of providing funds for
authorized programs."'" The Hill action was brought to enjoin con-
struction of the Tellico Dam project because it had been determined
that the snail darter, an endangered species, lives only in that portion of
the Little Tennessee River that would be completely inundated by the
reservoir created by the Tellico Dam. 2 It had been unsuccessfully ar-
gued that Congress overrode the Endangered Species Act, which pro-
tected the snail darter, by approving appropriations for the dam after it
had learned of the snail darter's possible extinction. The Court, how-
ever, was "unable to conclude that the Act ha[d] been in any respect
amended or repealed. '53 The Court affirmed the court of appeals' rul-
ing that the Endangered Species Act required the halting of all activi-
ties incident to the project which might destroy the habitat of the snail
darter "until Congress, by appropriate legislation, exempts Tellico from
compliance with the Act."54 It is ironic that when the Senate decided to
follow the court of appeals' suggestion and exempt the Tellico Dam
from the Endangered Species Act, the Senate attached the exemption
to, of all things, an appropriations bill.5
The Andrus Court did, however, note a situation in which it would
be feasible to require that an EIS accompany an appropriations re-
quest. The Court stated:
For example, if an agency were to seek an appropriation to
initiate a major new program that would significantly affect
the quality of the human environment, or if it were to decline
to ask for funding so as to terminate a program with a similar
effect, the agency would have been required to include EISs in
the recommendations or reports on the proposed underlying
programmatic decisions. 6
49. The Agricultural Marketing Service once had its entire appropriation for marketing serv-
ices cut because of a dispute over poultry inspection. See A. WILDAVSKY, BUDGETING 45-46
(1975) (partisan controversies are the largest single cause of shifts in relationships between the
Agencies and Congress). The Bonneville and Southeast Power Administrations were consistently
denied funds for construction of new facilities but their appropriations began to increase after
1956 when they agreed to purchase private power. Id.
50. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
51. Id. at 190. See notes 100-09 infra and accompanying text.
52. 437 U.S. at 161.
53. Id. at 189.
54. Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064, 1075 (6th Cir. 1977).
55. N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1979, § 4 at E-7.
56. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 99 S. Ct. at 2344 n.22.
1980]
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It would seem, therefore, that if an agency, in its appropriations re-
quest, announces the initiation of a new program, then that request
would be a "report or recommendation" requiring an EIS. Similarly,
the termination of a major program would require an EIS. A cutback
in the NWRS budget would result in the termination of some of the
System's programs. One wildlife refuge administrator involved in the
budgetary process of the Fish and Wildlife Service stated:
The various component programs in the refuge system's
budget contribute directly to. . .the preservation and conser-
vation of wildlife. . . .Thus, decisions whether or not to in-
clude hunting programs as a part of the refuge program and
concomitant decisions whether or not to provide staff to regu-
late and supervise such hunting programs have significant en-
vironmental effects. Similarly, budgetary decisions to vacate
refuges may involve direct losses in wildlife production; deci-
sions to defer purchases of disappearing wetlands may con-
tribute directly to the loss of the national migratory bird
populations; decisions to eliminate staffing for active manage-
ment of wildlife habitat may mean such deterioration of
habitat that wildlife is lost; deferment of a program for main-
tenance and rehabilitation of facilities such as water im-
poundments may mean the direct loss of wildlife habitat and
diminished wildlife production; and decisions to eliminate ac-
cess to certain size or low priority refuges directly affects pub-
lic use of such refuges for educational and recreational
purposes.5 7
The Andrus Court was in error by not recognizing that the effect of the
NWRS static funding was the equivalent of the Court's example of de-
clining to ask for funding so as to terminate a program. The expansion
of the System, coupled with its zero budget growth, would obviously
have a significant effect upon the quality of the human environment. It
was this type of effect that the EIS was intended to measure. The Court
nullified the need for an EIS because the variety of ways in which to
respond to a budget request made it "impossible to predict whether
...any particular budget cut will in fact significantly affect the quality
of the human environment." 58
Another reason for the Court's reluctance to require an EIS at the
appropriation stage was a desire to avoid bureaucratic repetition. The
Court indicated that preparation of an EIS to accompany a budgetary
57. Brief for Respondent at 24 n.16, Andrus v. Sierra Club, 99 S. Ct. 2335 (1979).
58. 99 S. Ct. at 2344.
[Vol. 15:553
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curtailment of an ongoing project such as the NWRS would result in
repetitive EISs. In other words, an EIS prepared to accompany the
annual appropriations request, and subsequent to the initial EIS pre-
pared at the time the project was undertaken, would result in repetitive
treatment of many environmental issues. On eight occasions the Court
noted the redundancy that would occur if an EIS was required at the
appropriation stage.59
Apprehension over the EIS becoming redundant and concern with
the inability to predict the environmental effects of a budget curtail-
ment could have been alleviated if the Court had emphasized tiering in
the EIS process.
"Tiering" refers to the coverage of general matters in broader
environmental impact statements (such as national program
or policy statements) with subsequent narrower statements or
environmental analyses (such as regional or basinwide pro-
gram statements or ultimately site-specific statements) incor-
porating by reference the general discussions and
concentrating solely on the issues specific to the statement
subsequently prepared.6"
If the NWRS had prepared tiered EISs, the Court, by studying the
most current tier, could determine the specific effects of a budget reduc-
tion. The Court could determine whether the budget cut would have a
significant effect upon the environment. The CEQ regulations, to
which the Court referred for its definition of legislation, encourage tier-
ing in order to avoid repetition.61 Thus, the tiering process would pre-
vent the expected flood of repetitive EISs because the new EIS would
refer only to the specific alteration in the overall policy. It should also
be noted that tiering would not require an EIS concerning "the annual
budget request for virtually every ongoing program ' 62 because the ba-
sic requirement that the proposal must be one "significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment '63 would still be applicable to
59. The following statements indicate the Court's concern with trivializing NEPA: "An EIS
on the annual budget request.. . would trivialize NEPA."; "[S]uch an interpretation would be a
'reductio ad absurdum .... 1 .Id. at 2341. "Any other result would create unnecessary redun-
dancy."; "IThe resulting EISs would merely recapitulate. ... Id. at 2343. "[A]n EIS at the
appropriation stage would only be repetitive."; "[W]ould merely be redundant."; "An EIS. . . at
the appropriation stage would add nothing."; "Moreover, this redundancy. ... Id. at 2344.
60. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.28 (1979).
61. The new CEQ regulations encourage tiering "to eliminate repetitive discussions of the
same issues and to focus on the actual issues ripe for decision at each level of environmental
review. ... 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (1979).
62. 99 S. Ct. at 2341.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
1980]
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exempt many agencies from the EIS requirement.
The Andrus Court went to great lengths to base its decision on new
CEQ regulations which stated that "the Council in its experience [had]
found that preparation of EISs is illsuited to the budget preparation
process."' Previous CEQ guidelines had stated that agencies were re-
quired to prepare an EIS to accompany appropriations requests. The
Andrus Court, pursuant to an executive order declaring the CEQ regu-
lations to be binding on the agencies, 65 treated the CEQ interpretations
as being authoritative, as opposed to being merely influential.66 The
Andrus Court, therefore, set precedent in its treatment of the CEQ's
interpretation of EIS preparation with respect to appropriations re-
quests. The Andrus decision firmly established that the CEQ's inter-
pretation is authoritative. No longer will the CEQ's viewpoint be only
one among others to be considered.67 Any future challenges to the reg-
ulations will be facing a presumption of validity. The courts should
still, however, require the Council to show that the regulation does not
violate NEPA's intent.68 Such reasoning may become circular in light
of the Andrus Court's decision to ignore the legislative history and to
rely instead upon the CEQ interpretation of the Act. The dominant
role given to the CEQ regulations is not warranted given the scant jus-
tification for the CEQ's position69 and the contrary expressions found
in the legislative history.7 °
The Court does not provide adequate support for its assertions
that appropriations requests do not fall within the mandate of NEPA.
Rather, the Court seems to have reached a conclusion and then cited
facts in its support. The purpose of the following analysis is to examine
the National Environmental Policy Act, its legislative history, and rele-
vant cases decided under it. This analysis will reveal the error in the
Court's decision and the CEQ guidelines upon which it is based. It will
demonstrate that NEPA mandates an EIS at the, appropriations stage
of federal action.
64. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, 55,989 (1978).
65. Exec. Order No. 11,991, 3 C.F.R. 123 (1978).
66. Sierrh Club v. Lynne, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1972) (CEQ guidelines, although highly per-
suasive, do not govern compliance with NEPA); Greene County Planning Bd, v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972) (CEQ guidelines are merely advisory).
67. See notes 114-54 infra and accompanying text.
68. See notes 71-113 infra and accompanying text.
69. See notes 139-54 infra and accompanying text.
70. See notes 114-16 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 15:553
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IV. SCOPE AND PURPOSES OF NEPA
NEPA was enacted when public interest in the quality of the envi-
ronment was rising. The Santa Barbara oil spill had recently occurred,
the Cuyahoga River had caught fire, and the news had been laden with
stories of environmental disasters." "A primary purpose of the bill
[was] to restore public confidence in the Federal Government's capac-
ity to achieve important public purposes and objectives and at the same
time to maintain and enhance the quality of the environment."72 A
legislator's vote for NEPA was responsive to public concern inasmuch
as it symbolized a vote for a clean and healthy environment. The Act
quickly became the legal cutting edge of what some labeled an "envi-
ronmental revolution."73 The reforming spirit, however, did not ex-
plode until Earth Day, 1970. Then, much of the nation's citizenry
joined campus activists, scientists, and politicans in recognizing the
value of a clean environment and the danger of the forces threatening
it.74
As is evident from the language of the Act, NEPA is directed at
federal actions and not those of private individuals.75 NEPA forbade
nothing specifically but only mandated formal public consideration of
environmental values in all major federal projects. The Act has con-
sistently been interpreted to apply to federal actions involving large
construction programs, provisions of services, and federal grants and
loans.76 Difficulties arise, however, in attempts to apply NEPA to situ-
71. R. LIROFF, A NATURAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEPA AND ITS AFTERMATH 5
(1976). The following editorial appeared in the New York Times:
By land, sea and air, the enemies of man's survival relentlessly press their attack.
The most dangerous of all these enemies is man's own undirected technology. The radi-
oactive poisons from nuclear tests, the runoff into rivers of nitrogen fertilizers, the smog
from automobiles, the pesticides in the food chains, and the destruction of topsoil by
strip mining are examples of the failure to foresee and control the untoward conse-
quences of modern technology.
N.Y. Times, May 3, 1969, at 34, col. 2.
72. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 296].
73. N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1979, § 12 at 10, col. 1.
74. Id.
75. "By its terms NEPA applies only to the federal agencies." F. ANDERSEN, NEPA IN THE
CouRTs, A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 57 (1973).
76. See id. at 57-58, 76-77. For examples of the virtually unlimited types of actions to which
NEPA has been applied see Comment, The Developing Common Law of 'Major FederalAction"
Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 31 ARK. L. REV. 254, 259 (1977). The Supreme
Court has recently ruled that NEPA is not applicable when an agency's rules create a clear statu-
tory conflict. In Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776 (1976), a land devel-
oper's statement of record was to become effective 30 days after being filed with the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) unless found to be incomplete or inaccurate. The
Court concluded that the 30 day deadline was too short a time for HUD to complete an EIS.
1980]
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ations in which the proposed action is arguably non-major or non-fed-
eral or where it is unclear that action or a proposal for action has
occurred at all.77 Courts often find that a federally funded project is
major federal action if it requires substantial time, resources, or ex-
penditures by a federal agency.7" This test "refers to the cost of the
project, the amount of planning that preceded it, and the time required
to complete it."79 These are easily quantifiable factors and application
of the test is straightforward. Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Grant ° is an example of an application of this test. In Grant, 706 thou-
sand dollars were contributed in conjunction with multi-agency plan-
ning for the construction of sixty-six miles of channel. This federal
involvement constituted substantial planning, time, resources, and ex-
penditures and amounted, therefore, to major federal action covered by
the strictures of NEPA.81 Courts often utilize this test without enunci-
ating its application. This conclusion is reached because it is apparent
from the magnitude of the project that the court is finding that the re-
quirements of the test have been met. 2
In order to ensure governmental consideration of environmental
values, President Nixon, in 1970, submitted to Congress a plan to con-
solidate widespread federal environmental protection efforts into a sin-
gle Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA rapidly grew
into the largest federal regulatory unit with a staff of more than 10,000
persons. During the decade following NEPA's enactment, statutes8 3
Inasmuch as the Secretary of HUD had the power to suspend the statement of record if it was
incomplete it could be argued that the Secretary was not complying with the requirements of
NEPA to the fullest extent possible. See Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. United States Atomic
Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir., 1971). "Considerations of administrative difficulty,
delay or economic cost will not suffice to strip the section of its fundamental importance." .d. at
1115.
77. Comment, Federal Environmental Litigation in 1977- National Environmental Polic
' 
Act,
2 HARV. ENV'T'L L. REV. 199, (1978).
78. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Lynne, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974) (HUD commitment to guar-
antee 18 million dollars in bond obligations is major federal action); Monroe County Conserva-
tion Council v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972) (EIS required because government to
contribute 60% of fourteen million dollars). See Note, Negative NEPA.: The Decision Not to File,
6 ENVT'L L. 309, 322-39 (1975).
79. Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972).
80. 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
81. Id. at 365-66.
82. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
83. NEPA laid the foundation for subsequent statutes designed to protect the environment.
Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1976). Clean Air Act, (codified in various
sections of 42 U.S.C.); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, (codified in
various sections of 33 U.S.C.).
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were enacted which required expenditures, both governmental and pri-
vate, of more than 200 billion dollars.
The wide scope to which Congress intended the EIS to apply is
evidenced by congressional analysis of section 102(2)(C):
Each agency which proposes any major action, such as
project proposals, proposals for new legislation, regulations,
policy statements, or expansion or revision of ongoing pro-
grams, shall make a determination as to whether the proposal
would have a significant effect upon the quality of human en-
vironment.84
The Senate report indicates a very broad range of categories to which
the EIS was intended to apply. The clear intent of Congress to require
an EIS to accompany a proposal for reduction of the NWRS budget
can be seen in the Senate report language requiring an EIS to evaluate
the environmental consequences of the revision of an ongoingprogram.
It is unlikely that Congress intended to instill environmental
awareness into every area of federal decision making except the influ-
ential budget process. Budget requests have a substantial effect upon
the environment. For example, when budgetary levels for particular
wildlife refuges are lowered, "the result is generally to reduce sharply
the ability of the refuge to support wildlife populations and ultimately
to require the replacement of facilities at much higher cost than that of
maintenance and rehabilitation.""5 The Senate report indicates, there-
fore, that the circumstances surrounding the Andrus cause of action re-
quired the preparation of an EIS. The effect of the unchanging
expenditure allocated to the NWRS had the effect of revising an ongo-
ing program. Unchanging total expenditures had not permitted the Sys-
tem to continue to perform its duties to as great a degree as it had been
able to do at the time the decision was made to allocate equal amounts
of funds in each succeeding year. Thus, the System would be unable to
maintain the same operations and efficiency in 1979 that it had been
able to maintain in 1974 when the decision for future funding of the
System was made. In addition, there is a special relationship between
the policy behind NEPA, which attempts to promote an aesthetically
pleasing environment,8 6 and the purposes of the System in attempting
to fulfill that goal. This relationship is further emphasized by the Sen-
84. S. REP. No. 296, supra note 72, at 20 (emphasis added).
85. Affidavit of John S. Gottschalk, former Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, Brief
for Respondent at 23-24, Andrus v. Sierra Club, 99 S. Ct. 2335 (1979).
86. S. REP. No. 296, supra note 72, at 18.
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ate Report statement that "an important aspect of national environ-
mental policy is the maintenance of physical surroundings which
provide present and future generations of American people with the
widest possible opportunities for diversity and variety of experience
and choice in cultural pursuits, in recreational endeavors, in esthetics
and in living styles."8
The drafters of NEPA recognized that environmental factors had
frequently been omitted from consideration in the early stages of plan-
ning because of the difficulty of evaluating them in comparison with
economic and technical factors. As a result, the Senate Report stated
that "unless the results of planning are radically revised at the policy
level. . . environmental enhancement opportunities may be foregone
and unnecessary degradation incurred. 88 Congress recognized that
the policy and goals of requiring an EIS could only be achieved "if [the
EIS was] incorporated into the ongoing activities of the Federal Gov-
ernment in carrying out its other responsibilities to the public."8 9 The
purpose of section 102 was to ensure "that the existing body of federal
law, regulation, and policy be interpreted and administered to the full-
est extent possible in accordance with the policies set forth in this
act." 9° Federal agencies were expected to comply with this purpose9'
through the preparation of an EIS that would consider all relevant en-
vironmental factors and points of view in the planning and conduct of
federal activities.
The consideration of environmental costs during the stage when
economic resources are being allocated would fulfill the intent of
NEPA. Congress was familiar with the policy implications of agency
budget decisions and intended those critical decisions to be influenced
by the consideration of environmental factors. 92 The preparation and
consideration of an EIS at the appropriation stage would demonstrate
that environmental factors had been considered prior to the allocation
of federal funds.
It would appear, therefore, that, in situations such as that in the
Andrus case, the environmental effects of constant total expenditure
should have been considered in making the determination of whether
87. Id.
88. Id. at 20.
89. Id. at 19.
90. Id. at 19-20.
91. Id. at 19.
92. A. WILDAVSKY, BUDGETING 45-46 (1975).
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the annual budget should be approved. Thus, the Sierra Club's argu-
ments that the System's annual budget would have a significant effect
upon the human environment should have been considered. While it is
true that the Andrus Court may not have been able to predict the exact
effects of the constant expenditures and which programs would be ter-
minated as a result thereof, the Court should have required agency
consideration of those environmental consequences before an annual
budget proposal was approved. Such a decision by the Court would
have upheld the purposes of the Act in the sense that the environmental
consequences of an appropriations request would be considered,
through the preparation of an EIS, at the important stage of allocating
funds to federal projects. The Andrus Court acknowledged that the pri-
mary purpose of the NWRS was to "provide a national program 'for
the restoration, preservation, development and management of wildlife
and wildlands habitat.' , The Court, however, refused to order the
implementation of NEPA and the preparation of an EIS so as to assist
the System in fulfilling its purpose.94
The initial decision to file an EIS usually rests with the agency.
An agency's decision not to file an EIS is the event that prompts a legal
controversy. The CEQ, as authorized by executive order,95 issues
guidelines to aid an agency in its determination whether to file an EIS.
Although the legislative history of the Act gives some insight into the
congressional intent with respect to the role of the CEQ, it does not
appear to indicate the extent of CEQ's authority, the weight to be ac-
corded to its interpretations, and how its guidelines relate to the deci-
sion to file an EIS.
In relation to the Andrus decision, the question as to the CEQ's
authority arises because the CEQ had recently issued regulations which
stated that no EIS was required to be prepared with respect to a request
for appropriations.96 The issue related to these regulations is whether
appropriations requests are, in fact, proposals for legislation which re-
quire the preparation of an EIS. As previously stated, the Andrus
Court painstakingly drew the distinction between requests for appro-
priations and proposals for legislation.97 The status of appropriations
requests, as contrasted with proposals for legislation, has been ad-
93. 99 S. Ct. at 2338.
94. Id. at 2345 (The NWRS had a budget of 200 million dollars.).
95. Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 902 (1970).
96. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.17 (1979).
97. See notes 38-49 supra and accompanying text.
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dressed by the courts through the application of a "distinctional ap-
proach."98 This approach probes the differences, if any, between
appropriations requests and proposals for legislation.99
The courts have utilized two analyses under the distinctional ap-
proach. The first distinguishes appropriations from legislation by de-
fining the former as routine authorizations to disburse funds for
projects previously undertaken. Thus, appropriations are not within
the scope of NEPA.'°° This distinction has recently been expressed in
TVA v. Hill," l the snail darter case. The United States Supreme Court
utilized this analysis in refuting a claim that Congress had impliedly
overridden the Endangered Species Act by approving appropriations
for the Tellico Dam project subsequent to learning of the possible ex-
tinction of the snail darter. TVA's argument was that Congress had
expressed a desire to change its policy and had indicated its intent by
allocating funds to a project that violated the Endangered Species Act.
The Court rejected this argument because it could find no authority for
the proposition that Congress had repealed or overridden the Endan-
gered Species Act.'
The importance of the Hill decision, as it relates to the Andrus
case, can be found in the Court's treatment of an appropriations re-
quest as a proposal for legislation. The Hill Court did not require the
preparation of an EIS because "appropriations measures. . . have the
limited and specific purpose of providing funds for authorized pro-
grams."' t°3 Support for the Court's determination of the purpose of ap-
propriations can be found in the rules of Congress. The Court cited
rule twenty-one, section two, of the Rules of the House of Representa-
tives which states:
No appropriation shall be reported in any general appro-
98. Another possible approach, the technical-procedural approach, requires no analysis by a
court. This method would simply rely upon the CEQ guidelines and decide the case strictly ac-
cording to those guidelines. See Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
99. Unfortunately, such cases are limited because, despite the mandate in NEPA and the
reinforcing guidelines stated by the CEQ, administrative agencies have virtually ignored the legal
requirement of compiling an EIS to accompany an appropriations request. See F. GRAD, TREA-
TISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 9.02(l)(a)(ii) (1974); Anderson, The National EnvironinentalPol-
icy Act, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 238, 274 (1974). See generally Note, NEPA
Forgotten Clause. Impact StatementsforLegislative Proposals, 58 B.U.L. REv. 560 (1978) (expres-
sing the view that the EIS requirement for legislative proposals is possibly the best tool for
NEPA's successful penetration of the early decision making process).
100. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 189.
103. Id. at 190.
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priation bill, or be in order as an amendment thereto, for any
expenditure not previously authorized by law, unless in con-
tinuation of appropriations for such public works as are al-
ready in progress. Nor shall any provision in any such bill or
amendment thereto changing existing law be in order. 11
4
The Hill Court offered no other authority to support its narrow defini-
tion of an appropriations bill. The Court did suggest, however, that it
was motivated by a desire not to increase the workload of Congress-
men.'05 The Court believed that under its definition of appropriations,
legislators would not be required to "review exhaustively the back-
ground of every authorization before voting on an appropriation
.. , "106 The Senate Appropriations Committee Reports cited in Hill
illustrate, however, that Congress does, in fact, exhaustively review the
policy ramifications of appropriations requests before voting on
them. 107 An EIS would, therefore, be very informative at the appropri-
ations stage.
Unfortunately, the Andrus Court used the narrow definition of ap-
propriations stated in Hill to conclude that no review of policy deci-
sions or changes in the substance of legislation occurs during an
appropriations process. Based upon this narrow definition, taken in
conjunction with the CEQ's new regulations that an EIS was not re-
quired to accompany an appropriations request, the Andrus Court de-
cided that no EIS would be required to analyze the environmental
consequences of the System's annual budget.
It appears, therefore, that the Andrus Court closed its eyes to both
the environmental arguments advanced by the Sierra Club and the po-
litical realities of the legislative process. The Court placed too much
reliance upon the congressional definition of appropriations. In addi-
tion, the Court's strict application of that congressional rule was un-
warranted. It may be true that there is, in fact, a distinction between
proposals for legislation and requests for appropriations, but the
Court's rigid application of the distinction frustrates the purposes of
NEPA. This application fails to account for the major environmental
consequences that can result from the failure of funding to keep up
with the needs of an agency. Had the Court been willing either to deal
with the Sierra Club's environmental contentions or to take note of the
104. Id. at 191. See also Standing Rules of the United States Senate, Rule 16(4).
105. 437 U.S. at 190.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 163-64.
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political realities in Congress, then the Court would have been better
able to fulfill the purposes of NEPA by requiring the preparation of an
EIS to evaluate the environmental consequences resulting from the un-
changing funds allocated to the NWRS.
The second analysis utilized in the distinctional approach recog-
nizes no distinction between requests for appropriations and proposals
for legislation. This approach was taken in Environmental Defense
Fund v. T0. ° s In affirming the district court's ruling that construc-
tion of the Tellico Dam project should be enjoined until it conformed
to the requirements of NEPA, °9 the Sixth Circuit required an EIS to
accompany the annual appropriations request for an ongoing project.
Inasmuch as construction of the dam was begun prior to the enactment
of NEPA, it was argued that the dam was exempt from the Act. The
court, however, found that the Act's reference to "proposals for legisla-
tion," was broad enough to include TVA's annual appropriations re-
quest. The injunction was lifted when TVA finally complied with
NEPA through the preparation of an EIS.
The Sixth Circuit's decision in EnvironmenalDefense Fund v. TV
took into account the practical aspects of appropriations requests and
determined that they were within the meaning of the term "proposals
for legislation."' 10 The court felt that the rules of Congress did not
provide a sufficient basis for making a decision. The court believed
that, at most, the rules were only useful for "purposes of determining
procedural matters such as deciding the proper committee to which to
refer a bill or the time or duration of legislative debate." " The court
declared that the rules did "not require [it] to close [its] eyes to the
commonly accepted meaning of the word 'legislation'-the making or
giving of laws--or to the clearly expressed congressional purpose of the
NEPA." 1" The reality of the political process demonstrated to the
court that policy changes can readily be made through the appropria-
tions process without any ostensible change in the substance of the ex-
isting statutes." 3 Unlike the Supreme Court's Andrus decision, the
108. 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972). Accord, Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 477
F.2d 1033 (8th Cir. 1973); Scientists Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d
1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
109. Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn. 1972).
110. Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1181 (6th Cir. 1972).
111. Id. at 1181.
112. Id.
113. See generally Knapp, Congressional Control of Agrcultural Conservation Policy.- A Case
Study of the Appropriations Process, 71 POL. Sci. Q. 257 (1956); M. KIRST, GOVERNMENT WITH-
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Sixth Circuit's holding correctly accounted for the political reality that
laws can be changed through appropriations, and required that an EIS
accompany an appropriations request. The court's holding, therefore,
reflected and carried out the purposes of NEPA in the sense that it
required that environmental factors be considered at the appropriations
stage. The holding is indicative of congressional awareness of the pol-
icy decisions and implications that surround agency budget requests
and the intent to have those decisions influenced by environmental
considerations.
In Andrus, the environmental impact of budget decisions was sig-
nificant because they had a direct bearing upon how the Refuge System
would be staffed, managed, and maintained. In addition, the nature
and size of the System's thirty million acres is a significant part of the
environment. When taken in conjunction, these two factors indicate
that the inflexible nature of the System's budget would have a signifi-
cant effect upon the quality of the human environment.
V. THE STATUS OF CEQ AND THE EFFECT OF ITS GUIDELINES
When NEPA authorized creation of the CEQ, it did not specify
that the Council could make whatever rules and regulations were nec-
essary to carry out the Act's purpose. CEQ's function was to further
the provisions of NEPA through "conduct[ing] investigations, studies,
surveys, research and analyses relating to ecological systems and envi-
ronmental quality." 4 The Act provided for a series of duties of CEQ,
OUT PASSING LAWS 118 (1969). These authorities discuss how policy choices can be readily made
through appropriations without any ostensible change in the declaration of existing statutes.
114. Section 204 of the Act provides:
It shall be the duty and function of the Council-
(1) to assist and advise the President in the preparation of the Environmental
Quality Report required by section 4341 of this title;
(2) to gather timely and authoritative information concerning the conditions and
trends in the quality of the environment both current and prospective, to analyze and
interpret such information for the purpose of determining whether such conditions and
trends are interfering, or are likely to interfere, with the achievement of the policy set
forth in subchapter I of this chapter, and to compile and submit to the President studies
relating to such conditions and trends;
(3) to review and appraise the various programs and activities of the Federal Gov-
ernment in the light of the policy set forth in subchapter I of this chapter for the purpose
of determining the extent to which such programs and activities are contributing to the
achievement of such policy, and to make recommendations to the President with respect
thereto;
(4) to develop and recommend to the President national policies to foster and pro-
19801 571.
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only one of which applied to implementation of NEPA. I t5 CEQ's au-
thority can only be inferred from NEPA, because the Act was designed
to be self-effectuating. The legislative history points to the CEQ as a
board of review capable only of recommending changes "when they
appear to be appropriate.""' 6
NEPA's directives as to the role of the CEQ raise the question of
how much weight a court should give to the CEQ guidelines." 7 An
executive order" 1 8 is the primary basis of the CEQ's authority to imple-
ment NEPA and to promulgate guidelines. These guidelines have been
described as "not simply parallel to and separate from the judicial in-
terpretations of NEPA, but are instead a kind of hybrid creation-an
administrative-judicial gloss on the statutory language of NEPA. ''t 9
Even those courts that have relied upon the CEQ guidelines for support
have never explicitly directed agencies to comply with the guidelines. 120
Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribblet2t sheds some light on
the question of the weight to be accorded to CEQ guidelines. Gribble
mote the improvement of environmental quality to meet the conservation, social, eco-
nomic, health, and other requirements and goals of the Nation;
(5) to conduct investigations, studies, surveys, research, and analyses relating to
ecological systems and environmental quality;
(6) to document and define changes in the natural environment, including the
plant and animal systems, and to accumulate necessary data and other information for a
continuing analysis of these changes or trends and an interpretation of their underlying
causes;
(7) to report at least once each year to the President on the state and condition of
the environment; and
(8) to make and furnish such studies, report thereon, and recommendations with
respect to matters of policy and legislation as the President may request.
42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1976).
115. Of the eight specified functions of the Council, six delegate responsibility for gathering
information, analyzing data and preparing reports. One delegates responsibility for compliance
with NEPA's purposes and one for recommending policies to foster environmental quality. 42
U.S.C. § 4344 (1976).
116. S. REP. No. 296, supra note 72, at 24.
[T]he Board shall periodically review and appraise Federal Programs, projects, activities,
and policies which affect the quality of the environment. Based upon its review, the
Board shall make recommendations to the President. . .. [I]t is intended that the Board
will periodically examine the general direction and impact of Federal programs in rela-
tion to environmental trends and problems and recommend general changes in direction
or supplementation of such programs when they appear to be appropriate.
Id. at 24-25.
117. See generally Comment, The Council on Environmental Quality's Guidelines and Their In.
fluence on the National Environmental Policy Act, 23 CATH. U.L. REv. 547 (1974).
118. Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 902 (1970).
119. Comment, The Council on Environmental Quality's Guidelines and Their Influence on the
National Environmental Policy Act, 23 CATH. U.L. REv. 547, 573 (1974).
120. See, e.g., Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 417 U.S. 1301 (1974) (Douglas,
Circuit Justice); Environmental Defense Fund. v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
121. 417 U.S. 1301 (1974) (Douglas, Circuit Justice).
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was an action brought to enjoin construction of a dam project on the
ground that the EIS filed by the Army Corps of Engineers did not ade-
quately deal with alleged water poisoning and seismic problems
presented by the project. Mr. Justice Douglas, sitting as Circuit Justice,
found CEQ's interpretation of NEPA to be entitled to substantial def-
erence. Justice Douglas stated that CEQ "has taken the unequivocal
position that the [EIS] in this case is deficient, despite the contrary con-
clusions of the District Court. That agency determination is entitled to
great weight, . . and it leads me to grant the requested stay pending
appeal."' 22 Thus, Justice Douglas' opinion indicates that CEQ inter-
pretations of NEPA are entitled to great deference.12 3 The negative
implication to be drawn from this principle, however, is that CEQ in-
terpretations are not binding on either the judiciary or an agency.'2 4
The circuit courts of appeal have not been uniform in their defer-
ence 21 to CEQ's guidelines. In Environmental Defense Fund v. TV4,
the Sixth Circuit, after stating that a CEQ interpretation of NEPA "is
entitled to great weight,"' 1 7 went on to emphasize that it was also rely-
ing upon TVA regulations which were derived from the CEQ regula-
tions.' 28 The fallacy of this argument is that if the original CEQ
regulations are found to be not binding, then the agency's version
should also be considered nonbinding because they are virtually identi-
cal.
122. Id. at 1310.
123. Support for the CEQ interpretation may have been strengthened by the fact that the
proposed dam would have been constructed atop an earthquake fault and that "[a] town of 5,000
people [was] . . . below the dam and the wall of water it [would] restrain." 417 U.S. at 1303.
124. See notes 129-55 infra and accompanying text.
125. In other administrative areas in which the Supreme Court has deferred to administrative
guidelines, there have been one or more factors involved to support the guidelines. In Trafficante
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court deferred to the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development's guidelines because they were a consistent administration of the Act.
Id. at 210. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court deferred to the Equal
Employment Opportunities Commission guidelines and added that "[s]ince the Act and its legisla-
tive history support the Commission's construction, this affords good reason to treat the guidelines
as expressing the will of Congress." Id. at 434. Moreover, in Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965),
the Court stated it was showing great deference to the administrative interpretation. Great respect
is due to such interpretations "when the administrative practice at stake 'involves a contemporane-
ous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in
motion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.'"
Id. at 16.
126. 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
127. Id. at 1178.
128. Id. See also Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D.
Ark. 1971). The court, in supporting the administrative interpretation, relied on the fact that
recent decisions "support the view that NEPA was intended to be applied in such circumstances as
those before the Court." Id. at 744.
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The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, has, on several occasions,
down-played the significance of the CEQ guidelines. In Sierra Club v.
Lynn, 2 9 the CEQ required a 30 day circulation period for public com-
ment upon the completed EIS before the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) could issue a bond guarantee for a San
Antonio housing development. HUD issued the bond guarantee before
the 30 day period expired. The court refused to invalidate HUD's pre-
mature action. The court's rationale was that enough time, though less
than the required 30 days, had been allowed for the EIS to circulate.130
The court replied to HUD's violation of CEQ guidelines by stating that
"the Council on Environmental Quality guidelines, although highly
persuasive, do not govern compliance with NEPA."'' In a later case,
the Fifth Circuit further diluted the impact of the CEQ guidelines by
stating that they "are merely advisory, because the CEQ does not have
the authority to prescribe regulations governing compliance with
NEPA."' 32 The Second Circuit, in Greene County Planning Board v.
Federal Power Commission,133 also found that the guidelines were
"merely advisory.,' 34 The court stated a test of "not lightly" suggesting
that CEQ misconstrued NEPA.' 35 The Second Circuit standard, how-
ever, sheds little light on the proper weight to be given the CEQ guide-
lines. The standard would allow trial court discretion to disregard
CEQ guidelines almost at will.
To add more controversy to the issue of the authority of the CEQ
guidelines, there occurred a unique turn of the screw during the Andrus
litigation. The guidelines which were then in effect specifically pro-
vided that the types of actions covered by the Act include
"[r]ecommendations or favorable reports relating to legislation includ-
izg requests/for appropriations.x ' 36 In 1977, President Carter ordered
the Council to replace the prior guidelines with mandatory regulations
129. 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975). Accord, Sierra Club v.
Callaway, 499 F.2d 982, 991 (5th Cir. 1974).
130. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d at 58.
131. Id.
132. Hiram Clarke Civic Club v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 1973).
133. 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
134. 455 F.2d at 421.
135. "[W]e would not lightly suggest that the Council, entrusted with the responsibility of
developing and recommending national policies . . . has misconstrued NEPA. Although the
Commission's interpretation of 10(e) of the Guidelines is superficially appealing, it flies in the face
of Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA which explicitly requires the agency's own detailed statement to
'accompany the proposal through the existing agency review process.'" Id.
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in order to direct the efforts of federal agencies attempting to comply
with the requirements of NEPA. 137 The new guidelines contained a
reversal in the CEQ's posture toward the status of both proposals for
legislation and requests for appropriations in their relation to the prep-
aration of an EIS. The new guidelines stated that a proposal for legis-
lation "includes a bill or legislative proposal .. .by or with the
significant cooperation and support of a Federal Agency, but does not
include requests for appropriations.'138
CEQ's reversal in policy with respect to the status of appropria-
tions requests was first announced in proposed regulations published
June 9, 1978, three weeks after the Andrus decision rendered by the
court of appeals. The final rule was issued November 29, 1978, after
the petition for certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court. In the
final rules and regulations, effective July 30, 1979, the CEQ offered the
following as the sole justification for this major reversal in policy em-
bodied in its interpretative rulings:
Section 1508.16 defined legislation to exclude requests for ap-
propriations. Some commenters felt that this exclusion was
inappropriate. Others noted that environmental reviews for
requests for appropriations had not been conducted in the
eight years since NEPA was enacted. On the basis of tradi-
tional concepts relating to appropriations and the budget cy-
cle, considerations of timing and confidentiality, and other
factors, the Council decided not to alter the scope of this pro-
vision. The Council is aware that this is the one instance in
the regulations where we assert a position opposed to that in
the predecessor Guidelines. Quite simply, the Council in its
experience found that preparation of EISs is illsuited to the
budget preparation process. Nothing in the Council's deter-
mination, however, relieves agencies of responsibility to pre-
pare statements when otherwise required on the underlying
program or other actions. 139
A standard to determine the correctness of interpretative rulings
was laid down by the Supreme Court in General Electric Co. v. Gil-
bert.'40 In General Electric, a 1972 guideline of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission stated that those disabilities arising from
137. Exec. Order No. 11,991,3 C.F.R. 123 (1978) (amending Exec. Order No. 11,514,3 C.F.R.
902 (1970)).
138. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.17 (1979) (emphasis added).
139. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, 55,989 (1978).
140. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
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pregnancy could not be excluded from an employer's disability plan. 141
The Court found that the guideline was in conflict with earlier Com-
mission pronouncements and was inconsistent with prior interpreta-
tions issued by the Wage and Hour Administration with respect to Title
VII and its legislative history. 14 2 The Court stated that "the weight of
such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thorough-
ness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consis-
tency with earlier and later pronouncements and all those factors which
give power to persuade, if lacking power to control."'143
General Electric is similar to Andrus because in both cases the au-
thority to promulgate the regulations was not conferred by the enabling
legislation. The General Electric Court interpreted this to mean that
courts may properly accord less weight to such guidelines than to those
administrative regulations which Congress has declared shall have the
force of law or those regulations which are provided for in the agency's
enabling statute. 'I The General Electric Court, after applying the
above stated criteria, did not follow the Commission's dictates involved
in that case.' 45 The General Electric decision should have provided
precedent for the Court's Andrus decision. The CEQ's inconsistent
treatment of appropriations requests, in relation to its prior interpreta-
tions, and the lack of reasoning evident in its interpretation 46 of NEPA
should have led the Andrus Court to disregard the CEQ guidelines.
The conclusion that the Andrus Court should have disregarded the
CEQ guidelines because they were contrary to the purposes of NEPA is
further illustrated by Asarco v. EPA.1 In that case, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia set out specific duties to
be undertaken by an appellate court in reviewing agency interpretative
rulings. The EPA had issued regulations defining a stationary source
of pollution to include "any combination of facilities"' 48 while the lan-
141. The guidelines upon which respondents relied stated: "Disabilities caused or contributed
to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, child birth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job related
purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary
disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employment. ... 29 C.F.R.
1604.10(b) (1975).
142. 429 U.S. at 140-45.
143. Id. at 142. (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
144. 429 U.S. at 141.
145. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines failed to meet all three of
the criteria set by the Court. 429 U.S. at 140-45.
146. See note 139 supra and accompanying text.
147. 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Accord, Central of Ga. R.R. v. OSHA, 576 F.2d 620 (5th
Cir. 1978).
148. 40 C.F.R. 602(d) (1976).
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guage of the Clean Air Act defined it as "any building, structure, facil-
ity or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant."149 The
court believed that although the EPA's interpretation of the Clean Air
Act is to be given considerable deference, a reviewing court has the
responsibility to carefully examine the words of the Act, its legislative
history, and the reasons advanced by the agency to justify its new inter-
pretation in order to determine whether an agency's interpretation is
sufficiently reasonable that it should be accepted by the court. 5 °
If the Andrus court had utilized the above tests it would have
found that CEQ's decision to reverse its prior interpretation was based
upon what the Council considered unwise or impractical. Such opin-
ions as to impracticality are of little relevance to the question of
whether Congress intended agency requests for appropriations to be
proposals for legislation. 5' In addition, such sterile considerations of
impracticality frustrate the purposes of the Act. Moreover, before a
court will defer to an agency's interpretation that conflicts with an ear-
lier interpretation, made contemporaneous to the enactment of the stat-
ute, it is essential that the agency put forth a reasoned analysis for its
change of direction.'52 This reasoned analysis does not appear in the
CEQ's brief statement of impracticality. The circumstances surround-
ing CEQ's abrupt reversal of its interpretation, along with the question-
able nature of the agency's purported justifications for the change,
provide indications that the new policy may not be well founded. Fur-
thermore, the unsupported nature of the reversal dictates that, in order
to advance the purposes of the Act, the Court should have ignored the
new CEQ interpretation and required the preparation of an EIS to ac-
company the System's budget request.
An agency interpretation that conflicts with an earlier pronounce-
ment of the agency generally faces a court'53 that is not willing to vali-
date the new interpretation unless the agency is "faced with new
developments."' 54 In substance, it appears that a court will be more
likely to accept an agency's reversal in statutory interpretation if it can
149. Asarco v. EPA, 578 F.2d at 326.
150. Id. at 325-26.
151. For congressional purposes of the Act see notes 30-36 supra and accompanying text.
152. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
153. West Helena Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 417 F. Supp. 220 (E.D.
Ark. 1976) (interpretation by FHLB would not be given weight where its interpretations had not
been uniform). See also In re Pacific Homes, 456 F. Supp. 851 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (court may
disregard comments by advisory committee on bankruptcy when they conflict with the Bank-
ruptcy Act).
154. American Trucking Ass'n v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397, 416 (1967).
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be shown that, under changed circumstances, the new interpretation is
consistent with the purposes of the statute. CEQ's explanation for its
reversal in statutory interpretation did not include any changed cir-
cumstances that would justify its reversal. The CEQ simply stated that
experience indicated to it that the preparation of an EIS was ill-suited
to the appropriations process. The Court should not have deferred to
the CEQ's statement of its experience because the Council admitted
that it had never received an EIS with an appropriations request.'
Without any changed circumstances to support the Council's reversal,
it is apparent that the new interpretation is inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the Act. NEPA demands consideration of environmental fac-
tors and the preparation of an EIS when decisions are being made.
The Council's new interpretation exempting appropriations requests
from the EIS process serves to thwart NEPA's ambitious purpose.
VI. CONCLUSION
The mere fact that federal agencies have widely ignored the EIS
requirement for proposals for legislation should have led the Court to
take a firm stand rather than simply affirm the status quo. The Andrus
decision means that the purposes of the Act will not be fulfilled in the
sense that NEPA's goal to protect and enhance the quality of the envi-
ronment will not be fulfilled. In that view, the Andrus decision repre-
sents a lost opportunity. The Court was presented with a situation in
which federal agencies were violating the provisions of NEPA by fail-
ing to consider the environmental consequences that might result from
a particular allocation of federal funds. The Court failed to seize this
opportunity to effectuate the purposes of the Act and impose the proper
remedy of requiring the preparation of an EIS at the appropriations
stage of federal action. The Act, the legislative history, and the rele-
vant cases all indicate that an EIS should accompany a request for ap-
propriations.
NEPA states that an EIS must accompany all proposals for legisla-
tion and major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
environment. Appropriations requests that have the effect of reducing
the funds with which an agency such as the National Wildlife Refuge
System is to operate, clearly produce a significant effect upon the envi-
ronment. An EIS would measure these environmental consequences
and provide for their consideration during the appropriations stage, the
155. See notes 99 and 139 supra and accompanying text.
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time when the decision maker "has an open mind and is more likely to
be receptive to such considerations."' 15
6
The legislative history of the Act constantly emphasizes that if
NEPA is to be successful, it must be fully integrated into the early deci-
sion making process of an agency. The Andrus decision, however, sep-
arates the appropriations process from the requirements of the Act.
Inasmuch as all Congressmen are aware of the power of the purse, it is
unimaginable that the drafters of NEPA intended to create such a loop-
hole in its applicability.
The Andrus decision is representative of a new struggle for envi-
ronmentalists. The enthusiasm of Earth Day has been institutionalized
in legislation, regulations, and litigation. That original wave of enthu-
siasm has given way, however, to an era of hard fought, case by case,
tradeoffs. The Andrus decision represents just such a tradeoff. The
new authoritativeness that President Carter desired for the CEQ guide-
lines has been achieved. The frustration felt by environmental groups
in observing judicial disregard of the CEQ will become a thing of the
past.
Andrus also means that federal agencies which have neglected to
prepare an EIS for appropriations requests now have the authority of
the Supreme Court in support of that disregard. The long range, and
more important, detriment that the decision represents is the lost op-
portunity to effectively influence decision makers with environmental
considerations at the appropriations stage.
Michael J Munns
156. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 418 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also F.
ANDERSEN, supra note 75, where the author states that early application of the Act would be more
effective to protect the environment. "By having the agencies comply late in the process, the
courts have arguably imposed unrealistic requirements for adequate and comprehensive consider-
ation of environmental values." Id. at 291-92.
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